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Countries experience welfare gains if they engage in trade. Does this also hold if environmental quality is taken into consideration? And to what extent are the gains from trade altered when effects of trade on environmental quality are not ignored? Assume a two-commodity world with commodity 1 being a pollution-intensively produced commodity. Let the home country have a comparative price advantage in commodity 1 and -after trade has taken place -let the home country specialize in the production of the pollution-intensively produced commodity. As a result of trade then emissions will increase and environmental quality in the home country will decline. Environmental disruption will reduce the overall benefits to society from trade, and a priori, it cannot be ruled out that the environmental losses may overcompensate the conventional gains from trade. This problem will be analyzed in Section //of this paper with Section I presenting the basic assumptions. Now assume the home country wants to protect itself against a deterioration of its environmental quality by enacting an appropriate environmental policy -for instance, by levying emission taxes. The problem then arises how environmental policy will affect comparative advantage and the gains from trade. This question is studied in Section III. In the final section some extensions are indicated and some conclusions are drawn.
I. ASSUMPTIONS
The frame of reference is a two-sector economy in which production generates pollutants as a joint product. More specifically, the following assumptions are made:
A 1 The home country is small compared to the rest of the world so that after trade takes place the relative price/; =pi/p2 in the home country is determined by the world market.
A 2 The production of commodities i'•= 1,2 generates pollutants as a joint product. For simplifying purposes there is only one type of pollutant. It is assumed that the quantity Sf of pollutants emitted rises proportionally or progressively with output, i. e.
Sf^H^Qi) W hhH!>0,H!'>0
(1)
A3
In order to keep the model as simple as possible we assume only one type of resource, R and a production function
A 4 Resources may also be used for pollution abatement purposes.
Let S\ indicate the quantity of pollutants reduced in Sector i.
According to equation (3) pollutants are prevented from entering the environment. Additionally it could be assumed that a technology exists that reduces pollutants ambient in the environment (water treatment).
A 5 Net emissions (S) are defined as the difference between emissions generated and emissions reduced
Pollutants ambient in the environment S are defined as
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A 6 Pollutants ambient in the environment cause damage to environmental quality U U= G(S) with G' < 0, G" < 0
A 7 Commodity demand is given by
denoting the relative commodity price.
A 8 In order to close the model, we assume that the government spends the tax income received in form of transfers to households. Consequently, gross national product and personal disposable income are defined as Y = pQ 1 + Q 2 (8)
Note that 7includes transfers not explicitly shown and that/) is consumers price and not producers price. If Y would be defined with respect to producers price, />*, emission taxes (and transfers) would appear explicitly on the right side of equation (8).
A 9 The resource input can be used for both production and pollution abatement, and is given
A 10 A situation is assumed in which the environment is used as a common property receiving emissions without the polluter being charged (Section II). In Section III we assume that the government levies an emission tax z on net emissions Si, with z being changed parametrically.
A 11 Firms maximize profits and regard commodity prices, factor price (r) and the emission tax as given. The conditions for profit maximizing factor demand are given as
which yields the usual conditions for z = 0.
A 12 If trade takes place, the balance of payments must be in equilibrium
II. GAINS FROM TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LOSSES 1. In a situation where no environmental policy is undertaken and £ = 0, gains from trade exist if trade increases welfare. Assume a social welfare function
Recalling assumptions (1), (4), (5), (6), (11) and (12), observing that pdEi + E\dp -f-dE 2 = 0 and that E\ -0 in the autarky situation and finally evaluating commodities at the price p of the trade situation, we have for the change in welfare
2. Assume dQ 2 < 0, so that the country specializes in the production of commodity 1. The first expression in 13' is positive, if
where °p is the autarky price of the home country. This is the known condition that country 1 must have a comparative advantage for commodity 1 if it specializes in the production of that commodity after trade takes place.
3. With respect to the second term, two cases have to be distinguished. First, if (H[dQ 1 ldQ 2 + H^)>0 or, due to dR 2 = -dR 1 , H[F[ < H'JFz commodity 2 is the pollution-intensive commodity since ////%' measures the marginal tendency of pollution of using a resource in Sector i. The result is as follows: If a country specializes in the production of the less pollution-intensively produced commodity, the usual gains from trade are increased by an improvement in environmental quality. The country reduces the output of the pollution-intensively produced commodity, the conventional gains from trade are enhanced by an improvement in environmental quality and the country exports pollutants via trade to the rest of the world. Second, if H[F[ >H' 2 F' 2 , the second term in 13' is negative. As a result we have the following outcome: If a country specializes in the production of the pollution-intensively produced commodity the welfare gains from trade (in the usual definition) are offset by a deterioration in environmental quality. A priori it cannot be ruled out that in the case of a strong preference for environmental quality and of a high marginal damage (in the physical sense) due to high levels of pollutants already in the environment the welfare loss associated with the deterioration in environmental quality may overcompensate the conventional gains from trade.
III. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE 1. In Section //it was assumed that no environmental policy is undertaken. Another way of looking at the reduction in the welfare gains from trade due to an environmental deterioration is that the comparative price advantage of a country is not expressed correctly if prices do not include all social costs of production. Assume now that the country undertakes environmental policy. How will that policy affect the gains from trade? Is there a trade-off between, the gains from trade and environmental quality? To answer this question we need to discuss how welfare is affected if environmental policy is undertaken when trade is taking place in the initial situation. We only consider the case in which the country specializes in the production of the pollution intensively produced commodity. We are interested in the sign of the expression
2. In order to analyze how welfare is affected in an open economy if environmental policy is introduced we use the system of equation (l)- (4), (7)- (12) consisting of 19 equations and the 18 variables Sf, S it SI, Q t , R { , R\, Y, C t , r, Ej. and E 2 , with p determined by the world market. The definition of Y states that total demand is equal to income, and the balance of payments equilibrium requires that the excess demand of the economy expressed in terms of commodity 2 is equal to zero, so that in a two-sector-model the definition of E% is redundant and can be omitted. Substituting and differentiating with respect to z we have (15) with Assume commodity 2 is imported and commodity 1 is exported so that E 2 > 0 and E\ < 0 when environmental policy is undertaken. Noting that the conditions stated are sufficient conditions so that the results may also occur with other constellations of the parameters, we have the following results:
Without any condition additional to those already stated in the assumptions we have from equation (V) in the appendix and from the resource constraint
f>0 (19)
3. With the introduction of environmental policy, resource use in the pollution-intensive sector (and its output) will decline. Environmental policy makes the production of the pollution intensive commodity more costly. Consequently we can expect that the volume of exports will decline. This will be the case if demand conditions are such that the internal demand for commodity 1 rises with the introduction of environmental policy. Observe that income Y will decline with an improvement in environmental quality due to resources used in abatement activities being withdrawn from production (see below). Therefore, internal demand for commodity 1 will rise, if commodity 1 is inferior (C 1F <0) and if demand for commodity 2 is more income-elastic than for commodity 1 in absolute terms, \C{ T \>\C^\.
Such an exceptional condition is not a necessary one, however. Assume a positive income elasticity of demand for both commodities. Then it may already be sufficient that the demand for commodity 2 is more income elastic than for commodity I 1 . This ensures that with income Y declining, the fall in demand for commodity 1 is smaller than for commodity 2. This relatively income-inelastic demand for the pollution-intensively produced commodity prevents internal demand from falling and makes sure that exports are reduced. Whereas resource use in Sector 1 decreases, and whereas the resource will be used additionally in the abatement activity of Sector 1, the result on the resource use in Sector 2 is ambiguous if Sector 2 is the less pollution intensive. This is due to the fact that resources used in the pollution abatement of Sector 1 may be withdrawn from Sector 1 only. Also if resources are used in the pollution abatement of Sector 2, they may come from Sector I 2 . From equation (19) we also know that resources used in the abatement activity of Sector 1 will increase. Further, we have £] dR\\dz > 0 and consequently ^] dRJdz < 0. These results, however, do not rule out the possibility that resource use increases in Sector 2.
Internal demand for commodity 2 will decline if a positive marginal propensity to spend for commodity 2 prevails. C' 2Y > 0 does not insure, however, that the quantity of imports will increase.
National income as defined in equation (8) will decline if commodity 1 is the pollution-intensively produced commodity. Observe that it is assumed that taxes are transfered to households, thus having an income effect. It would be more realistic to assume that tax receipts are spent for other purposes such as monitoring environmental quality or administrating environmental programs. Then additional resources would be withdrawn from the private sector and the aforementioned results with respect to resource use will become even more likely.
Environmental quality will increase with the introduction of the emission tax. Using (l)-(6), (9) (SIEBERT, 1976) . Assume the economy is in a situation of ecological paradise where no production takes place -point A. Increasing the production of commodity 1 with Q 2 = 0 generates pollutants but up to a certain level all emissions can be reduced by using the resource in pollutionabatement processes -point B. Similarly for increasing Q 2 with Qi = 0. Curve BC ensures the full employment of resources with no pollutants entering the environment (the assimilative capacity is assumed to be zero). If production of commodity 1 is increased (for Q.2 = 0) starting at B, resources are withdrawn from pollution abatement and environmental quality declines for two reasons: (a) increased production with an increasing quantity of pollutants, and (b) withdrawal of resources from pollution abatement. A similar argument holds for increasing the output of commodity 2 with Q\ = 0 starting at point C.
If R[ = 0, no resources are used for abatement in Sector 1 (/)). Similarly point E shows a situation where R\ = 0. DD' >EE' indicates that commodity 1 is produced relatively more pollution-intensively. Also it is assumed that H[F[ >H' 2 F' 2 is not offset by a comparative advantage of pollution abatement in Sector 1. Curve DE and its projection to the Q\-Q 2 plane (D'D') represent the traditional transformation curve with no resource being used in pollution abatement.
In order to keep the diagram simple we do not draw the transformation space of the rest of the world but only its production block (XYZ) which lies horizontally and cuts into the transformation space of the home country at F. Relative price in the home country differs from the world price in the autarky-point F.
Assume a no-trade situation F with both the home country and the rest of the world undertaking no environmental policy and °p </>. If trade takes place gains from trade occur as shown by the trade triangle associated with point F'. Environmental quality for the home country, however, has declined. This is the argument presented in Section II, above.
Consider now situation F' with the home country levying an emission tax and the rest of the world having no environmental policy. In this case our results indicate that Q\ will decrease, f/will increase and Q 2 may rise or fall. If we define an iso-price-line for varying z, we know that this line will move in such a direction that dQi/dz <0 and dU/dz > 0. If internal demand for commodity 1 does not fall too much, which we have ruled out, exports of the home country are reduced and, with/) given, the quantity of imports falls. Gains from trade are smaller -compare the trade triangle at point G. The gains from trade have been reduced by environmental policy. The im-
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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE provement in environmental quality is only possible by reducing the gains from trade 3 . 5. Substituting the results into equation (14) we have
We know that dYjdz < 0, i. e. the commodity bundle measured in units of commodity 2 decreases due to environmental policy. Consequently we have from equation (21) The term on the right side of equation (21') indicates prevented marginal environmental damage. The term on the left side denotes the emission tax in value terms, namely the emission tax z in real terms (i.e. in quantity units of commodity 2) evaluated with the marginal utility of commodity 2. Welfare will increase if in the initial situation the emission tax in value terms is lower than prevented marginal environmental damage. Welfare will not increase if the emission tax in a given situation is set according to marginal environmental damage prevented. And welfare will fall if in the initial situation the emission tax is set higher than marginal damage prevented. This result confirms the well-known rule for the setting of the emission tax according to marginal damage prevented in a closed economy for an open economy. It should be pointed out that (21') is the result of an explanation model and not an optimization model. Using the equations of our open economy as restrictions in an optimization model, it can be shown that the shadow price for emissions must be set according to marginal damage prevented.
3. Due to the small-country assumption the relative price for the rest of the world must be identical in F, F' and G, so that the production print of the rest of the world does not change. Also the production block of the rest of the world is drawn very small. Observe that in the real world the side of the trade triangle cannot be longer than the side of the production block.
Since zH{=p-r/F{ and zH' 2 =\ -r/F 2 , (21') can also be expressed as
In (21") the right side indicates the social costs of producing commodity 2, namely private marginal costs in real terms (r/F^j evaluated with the marginal social utility of commodity 2 and environmental damage attributable to commodity 2. The right side of equation (21"') denotes the social costs of producing commodity 1. The left side of both equation denotes the marginal social value of the two commodities 4 . Welfare will increase with environmental policy if in the initial situation (before environmental policy is undertaken) the marginal social costs of producing a commodity (private plus environmental costs) are higher than the value of that commodity.
Since for z = 0 the relative price must be equal to private marginal costs of production, environmental costs are not accounted for. Introducing an emission tax will reduce R±, whereas F[ will rise and marginal private costs of production will fall 5 . Also pollutants of Sector 1 will be reduced, marginal damage will be reduced due to a lower quantity of emissions and the marginal evaluation of the environment will fall since its quality increases (making the usual assumptions about welfare functions). Consequently, after all adaptions have taken place, commodity price and the social costs of production will be equal [compare equation (10)].
If in (21") and (21"') the evaluation of a commodity is higher than its social costs of production before environmental policy is under-4. In (21") p is the relative price of commodity 1, measuring one unit of commodity 1 in quantity units of commodity 2. Multiplying/) with 3W/dC 2 indicates social value of one unit of commodity 1.
5. It is assumed that the increase in F[ is not offset by a possible rise in r.
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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE taken, environmental policy cutting back production and reducing emissions will reduce social costs even further. In this case, welfare will decline and environmental policy should not have been undertaken in the first place. 6. As a limiting case we have the possibility that with environmental policy and with an increase in environmental quality the home country loses its comparative advantage by pricing herself out of the world market. Assume the closed country levies an emission tax z a -Then the autarky price p a is given by 
If equation (22) holds, the home country will continue to export the pollution-intensively produced commodity, however with a reduced volume. If the left side of (22) does not hold, either the trade equilibrium with environmental policy is identical to the autarky solution with environmental policy, or the direction of trade may be reversed 6 . 7. Finally, if a closed country opens up for trade and undertakes environmental policy at the same time, i. e. it moves from point F in Diagram 1 to point G, the change in welfare is indicated by equations (13') and (14). Whereas equation (14) can be interpreted as the welfare effect of a marginal variation of the emission tax, equation (13') describes a qualitative variation, that changes the market equilibrium conditions of the closed economy into a balance of payment restraint.
6. Assume the emission tax is set according to marginal damage prevented. Then further inspection of equation (22) The following two questions have not been included in the analysis. First, in reality we observe that for a variety of reasons countries tend not to use emission taxes as environmental policy instruments but emission norms and other administrative devices (e.g. permits).
In this case the question arises whether the country can increase its welfare by introducing a tariff on the non-pollution-intensively produced import substitute. This is an inducement to produce more of the less pollution-intensively produced commodity. The gains from trade may be reduced and environmental quality will rise. Note, however, that in addition to the problems discussed in the theory of an optimal tariff, a tariff will only improve environmental quality by a sectoral change which comes about through a change in relative price from the demand side. Similarly as a product tax on the pollution-intensively produced commodity, a tariff lacks the incentive to reduce pollutants through abatement processes. Second, if the assumption of the small-country case is given up, opening up a country for trade is accompanied by an improvement in the terms of trade. Also, if environmental policy is undertaken in an initial situation with trade, the terms-of-trade effect will influence the total change in welfare.
In the small-country case we have as conclusions: If a country exports its pollution-intensively produced commodity, its gains from trade are accompanied by a decline in its environmental quality. If environmental policy is undertaken under these circumstances environmental quality will be improved but gains from trade will be reduced. With the introduction of environmental policy, resourceuse in the pollution intensive sector (and its output) will decline. Moreover, the quantities exported and imported will fall, and pollution abatement will be increased. There will be an overall welfare gain from environmental policy as long as marginal social costs of producing the commodity (including environmental costs) are higher than the marginal value of the commodity in consumption or as long as the emission tax is lower than marginal environmental damage.
